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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the investment decision of an individual who may chose between
two uncertain investment projects with identical expected returns: a liquid and an
illiquid investment project. Conventional wisdom suggests that the individual at least
weakly prefers investing in a liquid asset to investing in an illiquid asset. As Laibson
(1997) shows in his seminal contribution, this insight fails to hold for individuals with
dynamically inconsistent preferences as produced with hyperbolic discount functions.
Such preferences motivate individuals to constrain their future choices by investing in
an illiquid asset.
We establish the same insight for a Choquet expected utility (CEU) decision maker.
Moreover, we argue that such an investment behavior is more plausible for pessimistic
rather than for optimistic CEU decision makers. The dynamic inconsistency of CEU
decision making implies that a CEU decision maker ex ante prefers a di¤erent liquidation
strategy with respect to prematurely liquidating a risky long-term investment project
than ex post, i.e., after learning her liquidity needs. Investing in the illiquid asset then
serves as commitment device guaranteeing an ex ante favorable outcome.
CEU theory (Schmeidler, 1987; Gilboa, 1988) is by now the standard generalization
of expected utility theory which incorporates ambiguity attitudes (as rst elicited by
Ellsberg, 1961) by considering decision makers who maximize expected utility with re-
spect to non-additive beliefs. Applied to situations of sequential choice, the assumption
of non-additive beliefs implies that a CEU decision makers preferences are - in gen-
eral - not dynamically consistent, that is, preferences may change upon receiving new
information. We exploit this particular dynamic inconsistency of CEU decision making
in our commitment-model of investment. After investing in the project, but before its
maturation, an individual learns her liquidity type, i.e., she learns if she either has a high
or a low desire for liquidity. Using this information the individual updates her beliefs.
The assumption of non-additive beliefs gives rise to several perceivable Bayesian update
rules (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1993). For two standard Bayesian update rules - the opti-
mistic and the pessimistic update rule - we derive conditions such that realized liquidity
types have strict incentives to deviate from the ex ante optimal liquidation strategy. In a
next step, we dene an optimistic, respectively pessimistic, individual as a CEU decision
maker who updates her beliefs according to the optimistic, respectively pessimistic, up-
date rule, and who additionally has so-called optimistic, respectively pessimistic, beliefs.
As our main result, we show that pessimistic rather than optimistic individuals strictly
prefer to invest in the illiquid asset.
The intuition behind our formal result is that sequentially rational individuals expect
to become more pessimistic in the future if they update new information according to
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the pessimistic update rule. As a consequence, individuals with pessimistic beliefs tend
to a premature liquidation of the uncertain long-term investment projects because their
decision making becomes more preoccupied with the possibility of the projects failure.
The investor realizes that she will be more pessimistic in the future than from her ex
ante perspective and therefore strictly prefers to sign a contract which guarantees, by
assumption, that there does not occur any premature liquidation of the uncertain long-
term investment project. That is, she strictly prefers to invest in an illiquid investment
project. On the other hand, the future realizations of an optimistic investor shift their
expectations towards the projects success, so that a sequentially rational individual
could not achieve any commitment-advantage from investing in the illiquid investment
project.
The decision theoretic literature on dynamic inconsistencies of Non-EU decision mak-
ing is mainly motivated by the view that dynamic consistency is a desirable - if not a
normatively indismissible - property of preferences, as argued by Kreps and Porteus
(1979) and by Hammond (1988). Epstein and Le Breton (1993), as well as Eichberger
and Kelsey (1996), consider dynamic consistency as a general property of preferences,
so that an individuals preferences are dynamically consistent, if and only if, they are
dynamically consistent in all possible decision-trees resulting from a given state-space.1
As their main result, Epstein and Le Breton (1993) demonstrate that dynamically con-
sistent updating of beliefs requires additive beliefs (compare also Eichberger and Kelsey
(1996), who show the same result for the special case of CEU decision making). In
contrast, subsequent research has explored conditions which assure dynamic consistency
of Non-EU decision making when only a given single decision-tree is considered (Sarin
and Wakker, 1998; Eichberger and Kelsey, 2004). For example, in the dynamic decision
situation, as considered by Sarin and Wakker (1998), CEU decision making is dynami-
cally consistent only if beliefs are additive at the rst stage of the decision-tree whereas
they may be non-additive at the second - and nal - stage of the decision-tree.
In contrast to this normative approach, we treat the possible dynamic inconsistency
of CEU decision making as a given fact that may bear implications for economic insti-
tutions. In particular, we consider a CEU decision maker who is ex ante aware of her
dynamically inconsistent preferences, so that she may desire some device for intraper-
sonal commitment.
The role of economic institutions and nancial products as commitment devices for
individuals who recognize that their preferences are dynamically inconsistent, has al-
ready been discussed in Strotz (1956). More recently, this approach has become very
popular within the context of so-called hyperbolic discount functions (e.g., Laibson, 1997)
1Also see Epstein and Schneider, 2003.
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where an individual may have di¤erent ex ante preferences over saving-decisions than
ex post. Our approach follows this literature on using economic institutions and nan-
cial products as ways of self-commitment by presuming a sequentially rational decision
maker, that is, a decision maker who anticipates her future decisions and therefore
chooses her optimal strategy by back-folding. Sequential rationality therefore implies
that the decision maker is ex ante well aware of the occurrence of these changes, i.e.,
of her dynamically inconsistent behavior. What distinguishes our approach from this
existing literature on the role of economic institutions as intra-personal commitment
devices is the entirely di¤erent mechanism by which dynamic inconsistencies may enter
our model: by decision making under ambiguity of, especially, pessimistic individuals.
There is a long list of real world examples for nancial products that provide forms
of commitment, such as pension plans, consumer durables and home equity, see Laibson
(1997) for a more detailed discussion. Laibson points out that such illiquid assets
provide a form of commitment, though there are sometimes additional reasons that
consumers might hold such assets (e.g., high expected returns and diversication).We
follow Laibson and abstract from such additional di¤erences in nancial products and
economic institutions and only focus on the liquidity aspect by modelling a very stylized
investment decision.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our model
of the liquid investment project. In section 3 the ex ante decision situation of a CEU
decision maker is described who has to choose a liquidation strategy. The individuals ex
post - after learning her liquidity needs - decision problem is explored in Section 4. Sec-
tion 5 introduces our notion of a stylized commitment technology provided by an illiquid
investment project. In section 6 we state rst results, concerning the strict preference of
CEU decision makers for intra-personal commitment by investing in the illiquid asset.
Our main results, referring to our denitions of optimistic, resp. pessimistic, individuals,
are derived in section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 Investing in a Liquid Asset
Suppose an individual invests in period 0 a xed amount of money, denoted x, in a
risky long-term project. In period 1, after learning her need for liquidity, she may
either prematurely liquidate the investment project or not. Because, by assumption, the
individual is uncertain in period 0 with respect to her liquidity needs in period 1, she
ex ante perceives the premature liquidation as an uncertain prospect, denoted 1. If,
in contrast, the long-term project is allowed to mature until period 2 the individual ex
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ante expects a prospect 2, which is uncertain with respect to the projects success or
failure. Thus, the individuals ex ante prospects (as perceived in period 0) with regard
to the two di¤erent actions - premature liquidation vs. maturation - can be depicted as
follows
period 0 period 1 period 2
l  x 1 0
m  x 0 2
In order to capture all aspects of the individuals uncertainty we introduce as relevant
state space
S = f(L; f) ; (L; s) ; (H; f) ; (H; s)g ;
where L (H) indicates low (high) need for liquidity and s (f) indicates success (failure)
of the investment project. Accordingly, the events - Low demand for liquidity, High
demand for liquidity, failure of the project, success of the project - are dened as follows
L = f(L; f) ; (L; s)g
H = f(H; f) ; (H; s)g
f = f(L; f) ; (H; f)g
s = f(L; s) ; (H; s)g
Liquidation in period 1 yields utility b if the individual turns out to be a type with
a high desire for liquidity, that is, if event H realizes (we speak then simply of a high
type agent). In contrast, liquidation by a low type agent is evaluated by utility 0. A
successfully matured project yields utility 1 whereas it only yields utility 0 in the case of
failure. In what follows, we presume that 0 < b < 1, i.e., a successfully matured project
is perceived as best scenario whereas premature liquidation is strictly better for a high
than for a low type.
A liquidation strategy of the individual determines for her two liquidity types whether
to prematurely liquidate the project or to let it maturate, i.e., a liquidation strategy is
formally dened as a mapping  : fL;Hg ! fl;mg. For example, the liquidation
strategy (m; l) states that the low type allows the project to mature whereas the high
type prematurely liquidates it. Let u ( (t)) denote the utility of liquidation strategy 
if state t 2 S realizes and observe that there exist four di¤erent liquidation strategies in
our model which give the following utilities dependent on the true state of the world
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(L; f) (L; s) (H; f) (H; s)
(m;m) 0 1 0 1
(m; l) 0 1 b b
(l; l) 0 0 b b
(l;m) 0 0 0 1
3 The ex ante Decision Situation
In this section we dene the individual as a CEU decision maker, that is, the individual
maximizes expected utility with respect to some non-additive belief. Properties of such
non-additive beliefs are used in the literature for formal denitions of, e.g., ambiguity
and uncertainty attitudes (Schmeidler, 1987; Epstein, 1999; Ghirardato and Marinacchi,
2002), degrees of condence in additive beliefs (Eichberger and Kelsey, 1999), pessimism
and optimism (Wakker, 2001; Chateauneuf et al., 2003), as well as sensitivity to changes
in likelihood (Wakker, 2003). Thus, besides the mere accommodation of observed choice
behavior, non-additive beliefs of CEU theory also o¤er a wide range of psychological
explanations for deviations from expected utility theory as, e.g., elicited in Allais (1954)
and in Ellsberg (1961).
CEU theory was rst axiomatized by Schmeidler (1986, 1989) for the framework of
Anscombe and Aumann (1963) who assume the existence of random devices that gen-
erate objective probabilities. Subsequently, Gilboa (1987) as well as Sarin and Wakker
(1992) have presented CEU axiomizations for the Savage (1954) framework - where
probabilities are derived from betting behavior as an exclusively personalistic concept -
whereby Sarin and Wakker (1992) additionally assume the existence of ambiguous versus
unambiguous events. CEU theory is equivalent to cumulative prospect theory (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1992; Wakker and Tversky, 1993) restricted to the domain of gains
(compare Tversky and Wakker, 1995). Moreover, as a representation of preferences
over lotteries, CEU theory coincides with rank dependent utility theory as introduced by
Quiggin (1981, 1982).
We proceed with a number of formal denitions. A non-additive belief (capacity,
fuzzy measure)  on the state space S is a real-valued set function on the subsets of S
which satises
(i)  (;) = 0,  (S) = 1
(ii) A  B )  (A)   (B)
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For A  S let u ( (A)) = u ( (t)) if u ( (t)) = u ( (t0)) for all t; t0 2 A. For a given
liquidation strategy  denote by E1; :::; Em the partition of S such that u ( (E1)) > ::: >
u ( (Em)). The Choquet expected utility of the liquidation strategy  with respect to
 is
CEU (; ) =
mX
i=1
u ( (Ei))  [ (E1 [ ::: [ Ei)   (E1 [ ::: [ Ei 1)] ; (1)
where we apply the convention that  (E1 [ ::: [ E0) = 0.
Fix some , interpreted as the individuals belief, and apply (1) to obtain the fol-
lowing Choquet expected utilities for the individuals four liquidation strategies of the
investment project described in the previous section.
CEU ((m;m) ; ) =  (s) (2a)
CEU ((m; l) ; ) =  (f(L; s)g) + b  ( (f(L; s) ; (H; f) ; (H; s)g)   (f(L; s)g)) (2b)
CEU ((l; l) ; ) = b  ( (H)) (2c)
CEU ((l;m) ; ) =  (f(H; s)g) (2d)
Write    if the individual prefers the liquidation strategy  over the liquidation
strategy  , and dene strict preference  and indi¤erence  in the standard way. If
the individual is a CEU decision maker there exists some belief  such that, for all
liquidation strategies ;  , and some belief 
(i)    implies CEU (; ) > CEU ( ; )
(ii)    implies CEU (; ) = CEU ( ; )
From now on we suppose the individual to be a CEU decision maker, which implies
that, for some given , the Choquet expected utilities in equations (2a) to (2d) repre-
sent the individuals ex ante preferences over liquidation strategies, that is, before the
individual learns whether she has low or high desire for liquidity.
4 The ex post Decision Situation
Consider now the ex post decision problem where a CEU decision maker has already
learnt her type, i.e., her need of liquidity, when she has to choose between premature
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liquidation vs. maturation. After learning her type, either L or H, the individual then
acts as if to maximize her Choquet expected utility with respect to the updated beliefs
( j L), respectively ( j H). In contrast to the case of additive beliefs, di¤erent rules
for updating non-additive beliefs are conceivable. Since this fact will drive our results,
we rst sketch some seminal results of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993).
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) characterize a set of Bayesian update rules such that
any act f may dene a specic f -Bayesian update rule if f is taken to be the unre-
alized alternative. In particular, an f -Bayesian update rule of a CEU decision maker
with preferences  over acts in some given Savage-framework determines a collection of
preference orderings over acts,
n
fA
o
for all events A, such that for all acts g; h
g fA h, (g; A; f;:A)  (h;A; f;:A) (3)
where (g; A; f;:A) denotes the act which gives consequences g (s) for all s 2 A and
consequences f (s) for all s 2 :A, i.e., for all s that belong to the complement of A.
Thus, the preference ordering fA denes :A as a so-called null-event, that is, all
consequences of acts in states of the world belonging to event :A are irrelevant to the
decision makers preferences over acts. For the decision theoretic approach, which derives
any individuals likelihood considerations about events exclusively from preferences over
acts, such an irrelevance of event :A is as good as if the individual perceives event :A
as impossible. As a consequence, a preference ordering fA stands for a CEU decision
makers updated preferences who has preferences and learns that eventA has occurred.
For an expected utility maximizer, the sure-thing principle (Postulate P2 in Savage,
1954) implies that all Bayesian update rules result in collections of preference orderings,n
fA
o
for all events A, which coincide for all irrelevantacts f . However, this is no
longer the case for CEU decision makers. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) show that CEU
preferences  are updated to CEU preferences
n
fA
o
for all events A, if and only if f
is an act such that for some event T
f = (x; T ;x;:T ) ;
that is, act f assigns to all states s 2 T the best consequence x and to all states s 2 :T
the worst consequence x.
Of particular interest are the two extreme update rules for which f is either the
constant act giving the worst consequence, i.e., T = ;, or the best consequence, i.e.,
T = S. If the consequence of a null event is associated with the worst consequence, x,
then Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) speak of an optimisticupdate rule:
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... when comparing two actions given a certain event A, the decision maker implicitly
assumes that had A not occurred, the worst possible outcome ... would have
resulted. In other words, the behavior given A ... exhibits happinessthat A has
occurred; the decisions are made as if we are always in the best of all possible
worlds.
Furthermore, they prove that the optimistically updated preferences xA of a CEU
decision maker, who learns A, are represented by the CEU of acts with respect to
conditional non-additive beliefs  ( j A) which result from the following update rule:
Optimistic update rule
 (B j A) =  (A \B)
 (A)
(4)
If the consequence of a null event is instead associated with the best consequence,
x, i.e., T = S, then Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) speak of an pessimistic update
rule:
... we consider a pessimistic decision maker, whose choices reveal the hidden as-
sumption that all the impossible worlds are the best conceivable ones.
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) prove that pessimistically updated preferences xA of
a CEU decision maker, who learns A, are represented by the CEU of acts with respect
to conditional non-additive beliefs  ( j A) resulting from the following update rule:
Pessimistic (Dempster-Shafer) update rule
 (B j A) =  (B [ :A)   (:A)
1   (:A) (5)
Now suppose the CEU decision maker of our model applies some Bayesian update
rule after learning her liquidity needs. Given updated beliefs, e.g., liquidity agent H
then strictly prefers to liquidate prematurely, i.e., l H m, if and only if
CEU (l j H) > CEU (m j H)
Thus, for updated belief ( j H), respectively ( j L), the following Choquet expected
utilities (6a) - (6d) represent the liquidity agents ex post preference rankings H, re-
spectively L, over premature liquidation vs. maturation.
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CEU (l j H) = b (6a)
CEU (m j H) =  (s j H) (6b)
CEU (l j L) = 0 (6c)
CEU (m j L) =  (s j L) (6d)
Assumption 1. Liquidity agent H strictly prefers premature liquidation to mat-
uration whereas liquidity agent L strictly prefers maturation to premature liquidation,
i.e.,
l H m and m L l
Thus, by assumption 1, liquidity agent L (resp. H) has a low (resp. high) desire
for liquidity, so that an individual prematurely liquidates the project after learning her
liquidity needs, if and only if, she has a high desire for liquidity.
5 Investing in an Illiquid Asset
We now introduce an economic institution which o¤ers in period 0, and subsequently
enforces, the following contract to the individual
period 0 period 1 period 2
 x 0 2
That is, the economic institution o¤ers an illiquid asset by simply investing the indi-
viduals money into a risky long-term project with identical returns as the individuals
liquid investment project and pays back the proceeds of the project in period 2. As the
only di¤erence to an investment in the liquid asset, investing via the nancial institution
here excludes the possibility of premature liquidation of the investment project. Simi-
lar to the pragmatic approach of Strotz (1956) and Laibson (1997), we simply observe
that real-world nancial institutions o¤er a great variety of illiquid assets whereas we
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do not further investigate why such an institution might be able to commit itself not
to prematurely liquidate the project. Furthermore, our idealized setup ignores any ex-
plicit or implicit costs of prematurely terminating the contract that might be relevant
for real-world illiquid nancial investments.
Investing in the illiquid asset yields exactly the same payo¤s as the liquidation strat-
egy (m;m). We speak of a sequentially rational decision maker when this decision maker
strictly prefers investing in the illiquid asset to investing in the liquid asset if and only
if (m;m)  (m; l). Observe that the liquidation strategy (m; l) is - by the standard
backward induction (backfolding) argument - the unique solution path if the individual
invests in the liquid asset. In our interpretation a sequentially rational decision maker
therefore invests in the illiquid asset if she anticipates that her liquidity type H - hav-
ing high desire for liquidity - deviates from a supposedly ex ante favorable liquidation
strategy (m;m) where no premature liquidation occurs.
Lemma. Suppose assumption 1 holds and consider a CEU decision maker who
updates her ex post beliefs  ( j ) according to some Bayesian update rule. If the CEU
decision maker is sequentially rational, then she strictly prefers investing in the illiquid
asset to investing in the liquid asset, if and only if,
 (s)   (f(L; s)g)
 (f(L; s)g [H)   (f(L; s)g) > b >  (s j H) (8)
Proof: To prove the lemma we have, by assumption 1, to identify conditions such
that (m;m)  (m; l) while l H m is also satised. From equations (2a)-(2d), it follows
that (m;m)  (m; l) is equivalent to
 (s) >  (f(L; s)g) + b  ( (f(L; s)g [H)   (f(L; s)g))
yielding
 (s)   (f(L; s)g)
 (f(L; s)g [H)   (f(L; s)g) > b:
Moreover l H m is equivalent to
b >  (s j H)
which gives (8).
Remark. Observe that, regardless which update rule is applied, for additive beliefs
- i.e., where CEU theory reduces to expected utility theory - the inequalities (8) become
 (f(H; s)g)
 (H)
> b >
 (f(H; s)g)
 (H)
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which is impossible to satisfy for any utility b. Thus, in our model an expected utility
maximizer always prefers investing in the liquid asset to investing in the illiquid asset.
This is not surprising since expected utility preferences are dynamically consistent: If
the individuals preferences were dynamically consistent, then she would, by denition,
also ex ante strictly prefer liquidation strategy (m; l) over (m;m). Our results of the
succeeding section are driven by the notion that this is no longer the case for a CEU
decision maker with non-additive beliefs.
6 First Results
This section demonstrates that a sequentially rational CEU decision maker may strictly
prefer investing in the illiquid asset to investing in the liquid asset, regardless whether
she updates her beliefs optimistically or pessimistically. We rst focus on the optimistic
update rule.
Proposition 1. Consider a sequentially rational CEU decision maker and suppose
that assumption 1 is satised. If the CEU decision maker updates her beliefs according to
the optimistic update rule, then there exist utility b 2 (0; 1) such that she strictly prefers
investing in the illiquid asset to investing in the liquid asset whenever her beliefs satisfy
the following two conditions (with at least one inequality being strict)
 (s)   (f(H; s)g) +  (f(L; s)g) (9)
 (H) +  (f(L; s)g)   (f(L; s)g [H) : (10)
Proof of proposition 1.
Apply the optimistic update rule and observe that there exist some utility b satisfying
equation (8), if and only if,
 (s)   (f(L; s)g)
 (f(L; s)g [H)   (f(L; s)g) >
 (f(H; s)g)
 (H)
= (sjH);
which is obviously satised under the conditions (9) and (10).
Now turn to the pessimistic update rule.
Proposition 2. Consider a sequentially rational CEU decision maker and suppose
assumption 1 is satised. If the CEU decision maker updates her beliefs according to the
pessimistic update rule, then there exist utilities b 2 (0; 1) such that she strictly prefers
12
investing in the illiquid asset to investing in the liquid asset whenever her beliefs satisfy
the following two conditions (with at least one inequality being strict)
 (s) +  (L)   f(L; s)g   (f(H; s)g [ L) (11)
1   (f(L; s)g [H) +  (L)   (f(L; s)g) : (12)
Proof of proposition 2.
Apply the pessimistic update rule and verify that there exist some utility b satisfying
(8), if and only if,
 (s)   (f(L; s)g)
 (f(L; s)g [H)   (f(L; s)g) >
 (f(H; s)g [ L)   (L)
1   (L) ;
which is satised under conditions (11) and (12).
7 Optimistic versus Pessimistic Decision Makers
So far, we considered two alternative update rules for non-additive beliefs, for which
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) convincingly argue that they express the implicit view of
the world of an optimistic, respectively pessimistic, CEU decision maker who receives
new information. Conditions (9) and (10) (respectively (11) and (12) ) formally describe
properties of non-additive beliefs such that a CEU decision maker, who updates her
beliefs according to the optimistic (respectively pessimistic) update rule, strictly prefers
investing in the illiquid asset to investing in the liquid asset.
Beyond the interpretation of update rules as optimistic (pessimistic) the decision-
theoretic literature also describes optimistic (pessimistic) attitudes of a CEU decision
maker by particular properties of her non-additive beliefs. In this section, we present
two specic classes of non-additive beliefs which reect marginal deviations from additive
beliefs such that uncertainty is resolved in an optimistic (pessimistic) way. In particular,
we consider so-called optimistic and pessimistic beliefs, which are special cases of the
neo-additive capacities studied in Chateauneuf et al. (2003).2
Denitions: Simple beliefs
A optimistic belief o is dened as a linear combination of some additive belief  and
a non-additive belief !o, which reects complete condence, in the sense that only the
null event ; is considered as irrelevant. Similarly, a pessimistic belief p is dened as a
linear combination of an additive belief  and a non-additive belief !p, which reects
2Pessimistic beliefs are discussed by Eichberger and Kelsey, 1999.
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complete ambiguity or complete ignorance, in the sense that only the universal event S
is considered as relevant.
 A optimistic belief, o, is dened, for some  2 (0; 1], by
o (E) = (1  )   (E) +   !o (E)
for all E  S such that  is some additive probability measure and
!o (E) = 1 if E 6= ;
!o (E) = 0 if E = ;
 A pessimistic belief, p, is dened, for some  2 (0; 1], by
p (E) = (1  )   (E) +   !p (E)
for all E  S such that  is some additive probability measure and
!p (E) = 0 if E  S
!p (E) = 1 if E = S
Notice that optimistic (pessimistic) beliefs are concave (convex) capacities. CEU de-
cision makers with optimistic (pessismistic) beliefs are therefore ambiguity prone (averse)
in the sense of Schmeidlers (1989) denition of ambiguity attitudes. To see why we speak
of optimistic (pessimistic) beliefs3, observe that the CEU of an act  for a optimistic
belief o is given by:
CEU (; o) = (1  ) 
mX
i=1
u ( (Ei))   (Ei) +  max
t2S
u ( (t)) ;
while we have for a pessimistic belief p:
CEU (; p) = (1  ) 
mX
i=1
u ( (Ei))   (Ei) +  min
t2S
u ( (t)) :
Thus, for optimistic beliefs the CEU of an act results from a linear combination of
the acts expected utility and its best outcome in some state of the world. The degree
3For a detailed discussion on this topic, we refer the reader to Chateauneuf et al. (2003) where
the relation between simple beliefs and Wakkers (2001) denition of optimism and pessimism, on the
one hand, and the multiple prior approach of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), on the other hand, is
investigated.
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of optimism  2 (0; 1] then measures how much the CEU decision maker evaluates an
act by the best outcome she may possibly achieve by choosing this act. Conversely,
for pessimistic beliefs the CEU of an act is given by a linear combination of the acts
expected utility and its worst outcome in some state of the world. How much the CEU
decision maker cares about the worst outcome possible for a chosen act, is then expressed
by her degree of pessimism  2 (0; 1].
We now combine the denition of optimistic (pessimistic) update rules on the one
hand, with optimistic (pessimistic) beliefs on the other hand, in order to characterize an
optimistic (pessimistic) CEU decision maker.
Denitions.
 We dene a CEU decision maker as an optimist if she has some optimistic belief
which she updates according to the optimistic update rule.
 Accordingly, we dene a CEU decision maker as a pessimist if she has some pes-
simistic belief which she updates according to the pessimistic update rule.
Proposition 3. Suppose assumption 1 is satised. If a sequentially rational CEU de-
cision maker is an optimist, then, for all utilities b 2 (0; 1), she strictly prefers investing
in the liquid asset to investing in the illiquid asset.
Proof of proposition 3.
Apply the optimistic update rule and substitute optimistic beliefs o for  in (8).
After some rearrangement, we obtain that there exists some utility b satisfying (8), if
and only if,
 (s j H) =  (f(H; s)g)
 (H)
>
(1  )   (f(H; s)g) + 
(1  )   (H) +  = 
o (s j H) ;
which is impossible for all  2 (0; 1].
Proposition 4. Suppose assumption 1 is satised. If a sequentially rational CEU
decision maker is a pessimist, then there exists some utility b 2 (0; 1) such that she
strictly prefers investing in the illiquid asset to investing in the liquid asset.
Proof of proposition 4.
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Apply the pessimistic update rule and substitute pessimistic beliefs p for  in (8).
Rearrangement yields that there exists some utility b satisfying (8), if and only if,
 (s j H) =  (f(H; s)g)
 (H)
>
(1  )   (fH; sg)
(1  )   (H) +  = 
p (s j H) ;
which is satised for all  2 (0; 1].
For optimistic (pessimistic) CEU decision makers the proofs of proposition 3 and
4 reveal that the question whether there exists some utility b satisfying the inequality
(8) of the Lemma becomes equivalent to the question whether the conditional additive
part of the belief,  (s j H), is greater than the conditional non-additive belief o (s j H)
(p (s j H)). The results of propositions 3 and 4 are then immediately implied by the
fact that for optimistic (pessimistic) decision makers
 (s j H) < o (s j H)
and
 (s j H) > p (s j H) :
That is, when an optimistic investor learns that she has a high desire for liquidity, she
acts as if the projects success has now become more likely than suggested by the additive
part of her belief. As a consequence, the high liquidity type of an optimistic investor
would never want to prematurely liquidate the project if such a premature liquidation
is not already optimal from an ex ante perspective. In contrast, after learning her high
desire for liquidity, a pessimistic investor regards the projects success as less likely than
suggested by the additive part of her belief. Thus, there might exist some utility b such
that
 (s j H) > b > p (s j H)
implying that the high liquidity type of a pessimistic investor has a strict incentive for
premature liquidation while maturation of the project would be optimal from an ex ante
perspective.
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes the decision problem of a CEU decision maker who has either to
invest in a liquid or an illiquid uncertain investment project. The illiquid investment
project of our model is simply characterized by an economic institution with the ability to
invest the decision makers money in the long-term project while excluding the possibility
that the project may be prematurely liquidated by the individual. For two standard
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Bayesian update rules - the optimistic and the pessimistic update rule - we then show
that a sequentially rational CEU decision maker may strictly prefer investing in the
illiquid project since it serves as an intra-personal commitment device which guarantees
an ex ante favorable outcome.
We further argue that such an investment behavior is particularly plausible for pes-
simistic decision makers, which we dene as CEU decision makers who apply the pes-
simistic update rule and who have pessimistic beliefs. The formal argument, by which
we derive our result, can be intuitively interpreted as follows:
Suppose an individual expects to develop a more and more pessimistic view of the
world when learning new information, so that she would liquidate an uncertain invest-
ment project because her pessimistic future-self comes to believe in the ultimate failure
of the project. Whenever such an individuals view of the world is not as pessimistic yet,
she may seek for an intra-personal commitment device in order to realize the uncertain
long-term investment project without premature liquidation.
By exploiting the dynamic inconsistency of CEU decision making, we present a new
rationale for investing in illiquid assets as a commitment device as an alternative expla-
nation to hyperbolic discounting, see, e.g. Laibson (1997).
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